Designing the audit The evaluation of cervical cytology screening programmes fits readily into the stages of the audit cycle ( Figure 1 ) and the model for integrating evaluation from management process to health outcome ( Figure 2) as proposed by the Faculty of Public Health Medicine". It is also useful to remember Donabedian's division of the components of health care into structure, process and outcome", Auditing a screening programme is not itself without cost. A considerable amount of time needs to be spent on activities such as liaising with the various professional groups involved in the programme; carrying out literature searches to define optimum practice; defining the data sets required and subsequently collecting, collating and analysing the statistics needed to generate them. Finally, the results of the audit need to be disseminated to and discussed with all those concerned and any resulting policy changes agreed and implemented. Who should be responsible for seeing that such audits are carried out?
Department of Health and Social Security Health Circular (88)1 stated that there should be a specific named individual, normally a public health physician, in each authority who has responsibility for the organization and effectiveness of cervical screening. It would appear logical that this individual should also take the lead role in audit and that this should become a routine, regular task for the Department of Public Health Medicine. addressed by all Districts running screening programmes. The approach needs to be systematic and this can be achieved by the use of an audit programme.
Introduction
The recent publication of the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust monograph on Screening in Health Carel has again brought the shortcomings of current screening programmes into focus.
One aspect identified by the report is the vulnerability of such programmes to poor organization. Unfortunately, this is clearly illustrated by the history of cervical screening in the UK over the past 30 years. Screening was introduced in a haphazard fashion and at no time was there a national programme applied across the country. Different policies have been recommended at different times and in different areas but with no evidence as to their relative effectiveness or efficiency", Compounding this has been the lack of systematic screening, with most smears being taken opportunistically or in response to patient demand. This has resulted in overcoverage oflower risk groups whilst women at higher risk often remained unscreened. As long ago as 1976, Knox used a computer simulation to demonstrate that a marked fall in mortality from cervical cancer should be expected if the total number of smears taken remained at then current levels but were concentrated in women in the 35-65 year age group", In 1985, the Department of Health and Social Security issued instructions to Health Authorities on the setting up of computer-managed call-and-recall schemes, using the computerized patient records held by Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs) as the database", Use of such databases should enable a systematic approach to cervical screening aimed at maximizing population coverage. How successful have these schemes been and are the other necessary components of the programme (facilities for laboratory processing, followup, referral and treatment) adequate to support them? These questions need to be regularly This allows the drafting of policies covering the different components of the programme including maintenance of the population database, the generation of invitations and handling of results, health promotion work with both programme staff and the target population, standards of smear taking, standards for cytopathology quality control, standards for the follow-up, referral and treatment of abnormal smears and the setting up of a system for routine monitoring of the programme as a whole. It is important to involve representatives of all professional groups involved in the programme in the development of policies if they are to be accepted and implemented.
The literature on cervical cytology is vast. However, clear guidance on standards for a screening programme are contained in reports such as those of the Intercollegiate Working Party" and of the British Society for Clinical Cytology".
Setting standards for certain aspects of the programme such as the generation of invitations, handling of results and monitoring is relatively easy. There is more difficulty in defining other aspects such as which cell types need to be present for a smear to be adequate, or which abnormalities should be referred for colposcopy and which can be monitored by repeat smears. Although the literature on these aspects is considerable, many conflicting opinions are expressed and it is therefore difficult to draw up a clear policy that can be agreed by all professionals working within the programme in a district.
Observing practice
The first task is to define the organization of screening in the District under consideration. This is not always as easy as it may sound. Because cervical screening has developed in an ad hoc fashion over many years there is likely to be considerable variation in practice amongst the professionals involved in the programme and this is unlikely to be clearly documented anywhere. The implementation of computerized call and recall systems usually means that there is a District-wide policy for the interval at which screening is offered but there may well be practices, covering large numbers of women, which have opted for a different recall interval. The nature of individual Districts makes a considerable difference to the organization of programmes and the ease with which they can be audited. For example, it is much easier to evaluate the programme in a semi-rural district where the population is relatively stable and the majority of pathology and gynaecology services are provided at one hospital than it is an inner city district with a mobile population, more than one hospital and considerable cross-boundary flow.
Having defined the programme structure, the processes need to be examined. This involves documenting the work being carried out by the various groups such as smear takers, FPC, cytopathologists and gynaecologists. This is time-consuming, requires diplomacy if individuals are not to feel threatened, and is likely to show considerable variation in practices across the District.
Current practice then needs to be compared to the agreed standards, shortcomings identified and plans for improvements agreed and implemented. This cycle should not be 'one-off' but must be carried out regularly with the participation of all concerned.
Finally, it is important not to forget the ultimate aim of the programme which is to reduce mortality Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 84 August 1991 489 from cervical carcinoma. It is, therefore, necessary to measure this long-term outcome and also shortterm measures that can be regarded as stages towards it. Such measures would include uptake and coverage, positivity rates and incidence of cervical cancer.
Lessons from an audit How easy is it to implement an audit cycle in practice? During the Autumn of 1989 a detailed audit of the programme running in one district was carried out and, subsequently, the programmes in two neighbouring districts were reviewed on similar lines, albeit in less depth. The problems in each were very similar and, one suspects, would apply in many other Districts.
The original audit was carried out at the request of the public health physician nominally responsible for the programme (the programme manager). A calli recall system had been introduced some 18 months earlier, but no consideration had been given to setting up a mechanism to ensure routine monitoring and evaluation. As a result, by Summer 1989, the programme manager was only too well aware that he did not know how the programme had been faring in the interim.
The audit followed the stages outlined above. Defining current practice was aided by the fact that the District was served by one general hospital which provided virtually all the pathology and gynaecology input to the programme. The computerized call/recall system was operated by one Family Practitioner Committee which covered the whole District.
One of the most striking problems to emerge was that, since the inception of the call/recall system, there had been virtually no communication between the various groups working in the programme. There was minimal communication between general practitioners and the FPC, concerning the eligibility of women for screening and the suspension from recall of women with abnormal smears. The programme manager was sent various copious lists of women who had either not attended for a smear or who had had an abnormal smear. He was also sent copies of annual statistics. He had no mechanism for regular cornmunication with other workers on the programme although he was known as the person to contact if a problem arose. The cytopathology laboratory sent paper copies of all smear results to the FPC. There were no other channels of communication within the programme. This led to a lack of identity and sense of purpose for the programme which was causing considerable disillusionment amongst those working within it.
The statistics generated by the FPC using the software from Exeter Family Practitioner Services were not presented in a format convenient for routine monitoring. There was considerable uncertainty as to the meanings of several column headings within the tables and this was shared not only by the FPC computer staff but also by the Regional support group. The presentation of the data as numbers of women in various categories means that work had to be done to calculate rates of uptake and coverage from the data given. This may appear to be only a small task to calculate for a District but becomes a considerable one ifdone for each individual smear taker. Attempting to do this raised queries over the validity of the data as certain GPs appeared to have uptake and coverage rates in excess of 100%.
The accuracy of the FPC database was called into question by the fact that a population size based estimate suggested that considerably more women should have been invited for smears than actually had been. In addition, there was no attempt to check the accuracy of addresses by, for example, monitoring the number of invitations returned by the Post Office.
The Cytopathology Laboratory ran an entirely manual record system which meant that the smear results were passed to the FPC as hard copies, thus allowing scope for error during transfer to the computer record. The statistics available from the laboratory were also limited by this and, therefore, could not be used to provide a check of the FPC data. Quality control was attempted through participation in an external scheme but there was no policy for internal quality control despite the clear guidelines set by the British Society for Clinical Cytology.
Health Circular (88)1 set out guidelines for fail-safe mechanisms to ensure follow-up of abnormal smears. Despite this, the District had no policy for a fail-safe mechanism. The Senior Medical Laboratory Scientific Officer in charge of cytology was attempting to operate a fail-safe system on her own, without any guidance 011, for example, how far she should attempt to pursue defaulters.
The gynaecologists had no policies on referral or treatment. They felt that general practitioners varied considerably in their thresholds for referral for colposcopy.
There was no attempt to collect any form of outcome data.
The other two Districts had similar, and in some instances worse, problems. In one District the programme manager believed that the recall interval was 3 yearly and that a consultant gynaecologist was operating the fail-safe mechanism. In fact, the interval was 5 yearly and the consultant had given up with the fail-safe mechanism once he realized that referrals were made to other consultants as well as himself. In the other District there was no fail-safe mechanism at all, attempts to institute one foundered when no agreement could be reached on who should operate it.
Implementing change
This appears to be the most difficult part of the audit cycle. One year after the audit described above, the most notable achievement has been the convening of a steering group to discuss the issues. Communication has been improved and a clear policy for the fail-safe mechanism with ultimate responsibility being held by the programme manager hal' been implemented.
The Exeter statistics continue to be unwieldy. Fortunately, a computer manager has now joined the FPC and is able to generate the statistics required from his own programmes. The FPC have been unable to answer queries on the accuracy of their database, pleading lack of staff to carry out any checks. Discussion continues on policies for referral of abnormal smears, but no consensus has been reached. To monitor outcome, it was hoped to set up a confidential enquiry into all cases of cervical carcinoma occurring in District residents. Unfortunately one key person was unable to contribute to the enquiry thereby halting progress.
It is difficult to see how many of these issues can be resolved. Although the programme manager is nominally responsible for the programme, in practice he can exert no control over the disparate professional groups involved. Adherence to reasonable standards depends on the goodwill and motivation of individuals, and some may not consider the cytology programme to be a priority. In conclusion, setting standards for and observing practice in cervical screening is difficult enough, but implementing change seems virtually impossible. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see easy ways of improving this.
